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This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with-
out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we
exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters informa-
tion about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are
many reasons for high reelection rates di⁄erent from incumbency status, we pro-
pose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection
success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideo-
logical and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the
literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides
an overestimation of the latter.
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It seems a well established fact that incumbent political parties enjoy some advantage in
the reelection. For instance on U.S. House elections, Gelman and King (1990) and Levitt
and Wolfram (1997) ￿nd that incumbency confers an advantage that ranges from 7 to
10 percent of the two-party vote. Lee (forth.) ￿nds that incumbency has a signi￿cant
causal e⁄ect on raising the probability that a party will be successful in a re-election
bid. The e⁄ect of incumbency is on the order of 0.40 in probability.
The potential causes that has been suggested to explain incumbency advantage
are based on the hypothesis that incumbents utilize policies and actions to raise their
chances of re-election: redistricting (Levitt and Wolfram 1997, Cox and Katz 2002),
seniority (McKelvey and Reizman 1992), lack of collective responsibility (Fiorina 1989),
informational advantages (Krehbiel and Wright 1983), access to campaign resources
(Goodli⁄e 2001, Jacobson 2001), franking, casework, federal pork, position taking op-
portunities, etcetera (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987, Fiorina 1989, Ansolabehere,
Snyder and Stewart 2000). This approach has raised concerns about the representa-
tivity of elections and the accountability of representatives. These concerns lie behind
(if they have not instigated) many recent political reforms like term limits or tighter
controls of campaign ￿nancing.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) extend the study to elections to all state executives
and ￿nd incumbency advantage magnitudes similar (if not higher) than for legislators.
They argue then that ￿ the theories of incumbency advantage based on redistricting,
legislative irresponsibility, pork barrel politics, and other features of the legislatures do
not explain the incumbency advantage￿ , asking for new approaches not based on the
irresponsibility of legislators.
2In this paper we propose a theoretical model that explains incumbency advantage
without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. The distinctive fea-
ture of our approach is to exploit the informational value of incumbency which o⁄ers
information about politicians in o¢ ce not available from challengers. We assume two
parties, the incumbent and the challenger, that compete for election in a majority vot-
ing system. Each party is represented by a candidate. Parties di⁄er in their ideology
and candidates di⁄er in their ability. The size of the e⁄ective budget controlled by a
candidate in o¢ ce depends positively on her ability. In order to eliminate the strategic
use of policies to a⁄ect the probabilities of reelection, we follow Alesina (1988) and as-
sume that parties cannot make credible promises, forcing candidates to implement their
ideal policy. Although policies do not directly a⁄ect the probabilities of reelection, and
hence do not have a strategic use, policies act as a noisy signal about the ability of the
incumbent, not available for the challenger. Voters use this information to update their
beliefs and, in this sense, vote restrospectively ￿ la Downs (Fiorina 1981, Downs 1957).
With all these ingredients, any advantage from incumbency generated in our framework
must come from the noisy information about the quality of the candidate.
Finally, an important point in our analysis is how to measure incumbency advantage.
Suppose that voters are so ideologically closer to the current incumbent, that they
prefer a low ability candidate from that party to a high ability candidate from the
challenger party. Then the incumbent party would win every single election without
enjoying any real incumbency advantage, since it would also win the election were it
the challenger. Thus, we depart from the use of the mere probability of winning and
propose to measure incumbency advantage as the di⁄erence between the probability of
winning of the current incumbent minus its probability of winning were it the challenger.
This measure captures the increase in the probability of winning directly derived from
holding o¢ ce.
We obtain the following results. Incumbency o⁄ers voters extra information about
3the type of the candidate currently in power. But only high type candidates will bene￿t
from this extra information. Low type candidates, on the other hand, would be better
o⁄ if their type were not revealed. Therefore, incumbency may be advantageous or
disadvantageous depending on the distribution of types (proposition 1). Furthermore,
the more informative the signal provided by being in power, the larger the e⁄ect of
incumbency (proposition 2). This implies that incumbency advantage obtains even after
eliminating any strategic use of policies. The presence of an ideological bias in favor or
against the incumbent mitigates the importance of the candidate￿ s type, reducing the
informational value of incumbency. When incumbency is advantageous, it reaches its
maximum value in the absence of an ideological bias and, for relevant values, decreases
as the bias increases. A similar argument holds when incumbency is disadvantageous
(proposition 3). Finally, we show that as candidates accumulate terms in o¢ ce, they
enjoy a higher probability of reelection, o⁄ering a selection based argument for the
prevalence of positive incumbency advantage (proposition 4). We emphasize that this
increase in their probability of winning does not result from voters appreciation of their
experience, but from a raise in voters￿con￿dence that the incumbent is in fact a high
ability candidate.
The main implication of our results is that if being in power provides information
about the personal characteristics of politicians, then we should revise estimations of
incumbency advantage which, most likely, overestimate legislature irresponsibility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and introduces our
measures for the probability of reelection and incumbency advantage. The informational
value of incumbency is the focus of section 3. Section 4 explains the role of ideology,
and particularly its relevance for distinguishing between the probability of reelection
and incumbency advantage. In section 5 we let incumbents have a history of many
terms in o¢ ce.
42. The Model
We have a continuum of voters and two parties, R and D. Each party is represented
by a candidate with ability ￿ 2 ￿ = f￿H;￿Lg, ￿L < ￿H: We interpret the ability as
the capacity of the candidate to transform the budget into public goods and transfers.
Given a public budget A; a candidate with ability ￿ e⁄ectively controls a budget ￿A:
We will refer to ￿A as the e⁄ective budget. Citizens know A but ignore the ability ￿
of the candidate. Hence, we can normalize A = 1 and let ￿ 2 R++: Let f(￿) be the
common prior on candidates￿ability.
The incumbent, whose representative has ability ￿; decides how to distribute his
e⁄ective budget ￿ between a public good g; and a per capita transfer t; such that
g + t = ￿:
Voters observe imperfectly policies t and g. They get a noisy observation, B ￿ ￿+";
where " is a random variable normally distributed with E["] = 0 and var["] = ￿2: Notice
that the distribution of B depends on the ability of the candidate. Let H(Bj￿) be the
conditional distribution of B; with E[Bj￿] = ￿ and var[Bj￿] = ￿2: Let h(Bj￿) be the
associated density function. Voters use the observation of B as a signal providing noisy
information about the incumbent￿ s type. There are many possible origins for this noise.
It may arise because the returns of the public goods may not have fully realized by
election time or because the actual level of public goods may depend not only on the
quantity of resources devoted but also on external factors a⁄ecting the environment.
For the analysis, the relevant feature of this noise is that the observed policy does not
reveal the type of the incumbent but it acts as an external signal of her ability.
At election time voters decide whether to reelect the incumbent candidate or to
choose the challenger. We assume, without loss of generality, that party D is the
incumbent.
5Parties￿Preferences
Parties have preferences over policies represented by the quasi-linear utility
uJ(t;g) = t + ￿J v(g); J = D;R; (2.1)
with ￿D 6= ￿R: Thus, parties di⁄er in their valuation of the public good. We take
the standard assumptions ￿J > 0; v0(g) > 0, v00(g) ￿ 0, limg!0 v0(g) = +1 and
limg!+1 v0(g) = 0: The limit properties guarantee the existence of a positive and ￿nite
￿ideal￿level of public good for each party. Let g￿
J be such that v0(g￿
J) = 1
￿J : Thus g￿
J
is the ideal level of public good for party J: It follows from quasi-linearity that, given






J(￿) = (￿ ￿ g￿
J(￿)):
Although it is not crucial for the analysis, it simpli￿es the exposition to assume that
even low types provide transfers.1 This reduces the di⁄erence between types to the
amount of the transfer. Parties￿preferences are common knowledge, but recall that the
ability of a candidate is private information.
A distinctive feature of our description of incumbency is that it wants to abstract
from any strategic use of implemented policies that could a⁄ect the chances of reelection.
For this purpose we follow Alesina (1988) and assume that politicians cannot make
credible promises. Also recall that only the size of the e⁄ective budget (the realization
of B), and not the particular policies, carry information about the ability of candidates.
It follows then that, once in power, candidates implement their ideal policy. Therefore,
party K obtains the following utility when a party J￿ s candidate with ability ￿ is in







Voters di⁄er in their valuation of the public good. Voter i￿ s preferences are repre-
sented by
ui(t;g) = t + ￿i v(g); (2.4)
with v0(g) > 0, v00(g) ￿ 0, limg!0 v0(g) = +1 and limg!+1 v0(g) = 0: Let ￿i be
distributed in [￿0;￿1] according to the continuous distribution F: Denote the median
voter by m; that is F(￿m) = 1=2:
Voters want to maximize their utility from the implemented policies. Given that
they only have imperfect information about the ability of the candidates, voters decide
to reelect the incumbent if they expect a higher utility from her reelection than the
expected utility from the policy that a challenger would implement. In this sense, voters
vote (at least in part) retrospectively ￿ la Downs, that is, they observe the history of
candidates in power to derive information about their types (Fiorina 1981). For the




J(￿)) be the utility that the median voter obtains from a
candidate of party J with ability ￿. Let ￿(￿j ^ B) be a probability distribution representing
voters￿beliefs about the type of the incumbent when the observed external signal is ^ B:
Formally,
￿(￿j ^ B) =
h( ^ Bj￿) f(￿)
P
￿02￿ h( ^ Bj￿0) f(￿0)
: (2.5)
Then, the median voter￿ s expected utility from reelecting the incumbent is
E￿(uI




m(￿0) ￿(￿0j ^ B): (2.6)
7Assuming that all challengers are newcomers randomly chosen from the initial distribu-
tion of types, the expected utility from the challenger, given that voters use the common







Probability of Reelection and Incumbency Advantage
Voters will elect the candidate that o⁄ers the highest expected utility. Therefore,
the incumbent gets reelected if E￿(uI
mj ^ B) ￿ Ef(uC
m). Observe that candidates di⁄ering
in their ability will face di⁄erent probabilities of reelection, since the distribution of B is
type-dependent and an incumbent may need a favorable realization of B to be reelected.
In particular, the probability of reelection for a type ￿ candidate is
￿I(￿) = Pr[E￿(uI
mjB) ￿ Ef(uC
m) ￿ 0j￿]: (2.8)
We can exploit the properties of the noise and rewrite the probability of winning in a
simpler way. This is done in the following lemma whose proof (as all other results) is
provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1. There exists a value BI such that
￿I(￿) =
8
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Moreover, the probability of reelection for a high type is never lower than the probability
of reelection for a low type.









8Next, we de￿ne the ex-ante probability that an incumbent party I 2 fR;Dg wins
as
￿I ￿ ￿I(￿H) f(￿H) + ￿I(￿L) f(￿L): (2.11)
Suppose that the electorate prefers a low ability candidate from party D; the in-
cumbent, than a high ability candidate from party R. Then, we would observe party
D winning every single election (see (2:9)). However, we claim that party D does not
enjoy any real incumbency advantage because, were this party the challenger, it would
still win. Therefore, holding o¢ ce does not confer any advantage to this party. As the
example illustrates, the probability of winning may be a misleading measure of incum-
bency advantage. Here we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that captures
the increase in the probability of winning directly derived from holding o¢ ce. We let
party D￿ s incumbency advantage to be the di⁄erence between its probability of win-
ning when it is the incumbent (￿D), and its probability of winning were it the challenger
(measured as the probability that an incumbent party R would lose, 1￿￿R). Therefore,
we de￿ne party D￿ s incumbency advantage as




Observe that IAD can take negative values, representing the possibility that a party
may be harmed by incumbency. Since incumbency provides information about the type
of the incumbent politician, if politicians are more likely to be of the bad type, more
information will hurt more often than help their ex-ante probability of being elected. In
this sense we can talk of positive incumbency advantage as well as negative incumbency
advantage or incumbency disadvantage.
93. The Informational Value of Incumbency
The main point of this paper is to highlight the role of incumbency as a source of infor-
mation about politicians. Recognizing the informational value of incumbency implies
that current estimations of legislature irresponsibility (the source of our concerns) by
incumbency advantage are almost surely biased. Namely, if high ability politicians are
the most frequent type, incumbency advantage overestimates legislature irresponsibility,
since the information revealed by incumbency would explain some ￿ potentially all￿the
observed advantage.
In order to concentrate on the relevance of the information provided by incumbency,
and following the empirical analysis of Lee (forth.), we make parties ex-ante compara-
ble by assuming that Ef(uI
m) = Ef(uC
m): Therefore, we abstract from any asymmetry
between the parties, except from one being the incumbent and the other being the chal-
lenger. This makes the electorate indi⁄erent between the two parties unless they have
extra information about the incumbent. The results of this section hold, with quali￿-
cations, under the more general case when the electorate favors one of the parties. We
postpone the analysis of the more general case to the next section.
When parties are ex-ante comparable, the probability of reelection is independent
of the party holding o¢ ce, that is ￿D = ￿R. It follows from (2.12) that incumbency
advantage is IAI = 2 ￿I ￿1; and hence an increasing function of the probability of win-
ning. Therefore, both incumbency advantage and probability of victory move together.
Incumbency o⁄ers voters extra information about the type of the candidate currently
in power. But only high type candidates will bene￿t from this extra information. Low
type candidates, on the other hand, would be better o⁄ if their type were not revealed.
From the incumbent party￿ s point of view, the information revealed from incumbency
works in its favor if the fraction of high type candidates is larger than the fraction of
low type candidates, f(￿H) > f(￿L); and against it otherwise.
10Proposition 1. Let Ef(uI
m) = Ef(uC
m). If f(￿H) > f(￿L); incumbency advantage is
positive, revealing the bene￿cial impact of information for the incumbent. If f(￿H) <
f(￿L); incumbency advantage is negative.
As the external signal becomes more informative (that is, as it facilitates the iden-
ti￿cation of the incumbent politician￿ s type), it increases incumbent party advantage if
and only if high types are more frequent than low types. In the limit, if incumbency
were informative enough to reveal the type of the politician, voters would always reelect
high ability candidates and kick out low ability ones.
Proposition 2. Let Ef(uI
m) = Ef(uC
m).
i) If f(￿H) > f(￿L), a more informative external signal (a smaller ￿) implies a larger
incumbency advantage.
ii) If f(￿H) < f(￿L), a more informative external signal implies a larger incumbency
disadvantage.
It is worth emphasizing that as voters become better informed about the ability
of governing candidates, incumbency advantage (if positive) increases without raising
concerns about legislature irresponsibility. In particular, according to Proposition 2,
improvements in voters￿information about the activity of governing politicians that
make more di¢ cult for low ability candidates to hide their type can explain some ￿
potentially all￿the observed increase in incumbency advantage. Hence, any analysis of
incumbency advantage should control for the informational value of incumbency before
making any kind of recommendation.
4. Incumbency Advantage and the Ideological Bias of the Electorate
In the previous section we made parties ex-ante comparable. However, electorates are
normally ideologically closer to one of the parties, which implies that voters may prefer
11the least skill candidate when it runs for the preferred party. How much skill voters
are willing to trade o⁄ for closer policies, that is, how much they are willing to pay
for the supply of the public good to be closer to their ideal quantity, will depend on
the ideological gap between parties and the di⁄erence between high and low skills. In
an extreme case, if the electorate showed a large ideological preference for one of the
parties, this party￿ s candidate would be repeatedly elected and incumbency advantage
would be zero, since electoral victory would have nothing to do with its incumbency
status.
To study incumbency advantage in the presence of an ideological bias and to deter-
mine the relevant values of the latter, we need ￿rst to introduce some more notation.
We say that the electorate shows an ideological bias towards party J if the median
voter is ideologically closer to party J than to party K; that is j￿J ￿ ￿mj < j￿K ￿ ￿mj:
This is equivalent to saying that her expected utility from J is higher than her expected
utility from the other party. De￿ne ￿f = Ef(uI
m)￿Ef(uC
m) as the ideological bias of the
electorate towards the incumbent party given that types are distributed according to f,
and interpret ￿f < 0 as a bias against the incumbent. Let IAJ
f(￿f) be the incumbency
advantage of party J when it faces an ideological bias ￿f and types are distributed
according to f. Obviously, for very large and positive (negative) ￿f the incumbent
always wins (loses) and incumbency advantage is zero.
The following proposition shows that incumbency advantage reaches its largest mag-
nitude in the absence of an ideological bias and, within reasonable values, it falls in
absolute value as the ideological bias becomes more salient. The intuition is simple. An
ideological bias dilutes the importance of the ability of the candidate in determining the
electoral outcome, and hence reduces the informational value of incumbency. Figure 4.1
illustrates this. When a party bene￿ts from incumbency (Figure 4.1:a), an ideological
bias, even in its favor, reduces its advantage since the ability of the candidate loses
importance. On the other hand, when the proportion of low types is larger than the
12Ideological bias  in favor
of the incumbent
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(b)   f(qH ) <  f(qL) Incumbency Disadvantage
Figure 4.1: Incumbency advantage (IAD) as a function of the ideological bias (￿f)
when (a) high types are more frequent than bad types, and when (b) bad types are
more frequent than good types. Values for the parameters in the example: ￿H = 5,
￿L = 1=2, ￿ = ￿H￿￿L
2 = 9=4; (a) f(￿H) = 3=5, (b) f(￿H) = 2=5:
proportion of high types (Figure 4.1:b), the incumbent party is harmed by the extra
information and hence a larger bias reduces its ￿ disadvantage￿from incumbency.
Proposition 3. Incumbency advantage attaints its maximum in absolute value in the










￿ for all ￿f 6= 0:
Moreover, for j￿fj ￿ :95 f (￿L)(￿H ￿ ￿L) and ￿H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿L + ￿, if
i) f(￿H) > f(￿L) incumbency advantage decreases as the bias in favor or against the
incumbent increases.
ii) f(￿H) < f(￿L) incumbency advantage increases as the bias in favor or against the
incumbent increases.
Although the impact of incumbency is always the largest in the absence of an ide-
13ological bias, its monotonicity needs some quali￿cation, which explains the conditions
in the previous proposition. Take for instance the case f(￿H) > f(￿L). The proof of
Proposition 3 shows that high type candidates bene￿t relatively less from a bias in favor
than low type candidates su⁄er from a bias (of the same magnitude) against, and vice-
versa. Since a bias in favor of the current incumbent implies a bias against the current
challenger were it the incumbent,2 it may happen that an incumbent facing a large bias
in its favor is not reelected with probability one, while the current challenger (with a bias
against) would lose for sure were it the incumbent. In this case, incumbency advantage
is negative and depends only on the probability of reelection of the current incumbent:
IAI(￿f) = ￿I(￿f) ￿ 1. Therefore, as the bias increases, the probability of victory of
the current incumbent increases, and so does incumbency advantage. We exclude as
irrelevant those cases where the probability of victory of one party is independent of the
candidate￿ s type and concentrate on situations where voters face a trade-o⁄ between
ideology and the ability of candidates. It follows from Lemma 1 that one party loses
with probability one if it run as the incumbent when j￿fj ￿ ￿ ￿f = f (￿L) (A￿H ￿ A￿L).
Thus we restrict the range of ￿f to the interval [￿:95￿ ￿f; :95￿ ￿f]:3
5. Incumbency Advantage and Selection
As already pointed out, incumbency may prove to be advantageous or disadvantageous
for parties presenting candidates for reelection. However, if high ability candidates are
more likely to survive than low ability candidates, we should expect to observe the
prevalence of a positive incumbency advantage.
2Recall that measuring incumbency advantage requires considering the hypothetical situation where
the current challenger would be the incumbent.
3The bounds on the range of ￿ represent a su¢ cient condition for the monotonicity of IA when
￿H ￿￿ ￿ ￿L +￿: These speci￿c conditions respond to the particularities of the Normal distribution and
speci￿cally ot its concavity-convexity and long tails.
14An argument for the selection of high type candidates has to do with the evolution
of incumbency advantage as candidates accumulate terms in o¢ ce.4 Incorporating the
possibility of accumulating terms requires adapting our notation. Let ￿t(￿) represent
the probability that the incumbent candidate is of type ￿ given that she won in the
previous t ￿ 1 elections. Observe that ￿1(￿) = f(￿); since the incumbent is running
for reelection for the ￿rst time. Using Lemma 1, if a candidate of type ￿ won in the
previous election was because the realization of B was such that B ￿ BI
t￿1; which
provides extra information about the type of the candidate. We will assume that voters
do not keep track of all past realizations of B but, instead, they just know that the





￿02￿ Pr(B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿0)￿t￿1(￿0)
: (5.1)
Notice that, since Pr(B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿H) > Pr(B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿L); if an incumbent candidate has
been reelected for t ￿ 1 terms; ￿t(￿H) > ￿t￿1(￿H): That is, the belief that a candidate
if of a high type increases with her terms in o¢ ce.
At election time; ￿t(￿jBt) represents voters￿belief that an incumbent who has been






Likewise, the ex-ante probability that an incumbent party wins the election for a






t(￿) represents the probability of reelection for a type ￿ candidate and its com-
putation is a straightforward extension of Lemma 1.
4This point is related to the literature that ￿nds a positive correlation between incumbency advantage
and seniority or political experience (McKelvey and Reizman 1992).
15When measuring the incumbency advantage of party D; represented by a candidate
who has been in o¢ ce for t terms, we choose to compare its current probability of









Since a good realization of B is necessary to be reelected and high type candidates
will on average obtain better realizations of B; the fraction of high type candidates
running for reelection for the t-th time increases as t increases. That is, high type
candidates are more likely to survive a larger number of consecutive contests. On
the other hand, since the belief that a candidate is of a high type also increases with
the terms in o¢ ce (5:1), voters will lower the required threshold BI; increasing the
probability of reelection for all types. Hence, as the following proposition shows, both
the probability of reelection and incumbency advantage increase with the number of
terms in o¢ ce.
Proposition 4. The probability of reelection and incumbency advantage increase with
the number of terms in o¢ ce.
Observe that, although candidates get more easily reelected the larger their tenure,
this increase in their probability of winning does not result from voters appreciation of
their experience. In our context, tenure gets rewarded because it increases the con￿dence
that the incumbent is in fact a high type and allows voters to ease her reelection by
lowering the required threshold BI.
Finally, a strand of the literature has emphasized a di⁄erent selection argument based
on the strategic retirement of candidates. This approach argues that incumbents decide
5Alternatively, we could have measured D￿ s incumbency advantage as ￿
D
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
R
t ); that is taking
as the hypothetical reference scenario the case when R was the incumbent for t periods. This approach
would increase the magnitude of incumbency advantage, but would not a⁄ect the results of the paper.
16to retire when their electoral prospects seem particularly low, producing an upward bias
in conventional estimates of incumbency advantage (Cox and Katz 2002, Engstrom and
Monore 2002). It is easy to incorporate this argument in our framework by assuming
that parties, unlike voters, learn the ability of candidates once in power and can choose
to retire an incumbent from running for reelection if they would rather be represented
by a newcomer. For simplicity, take parties to be ex-ante comparable. They they would
always retire low ability candidates and voters would learn that candidates running for
reelection are of high ability. Hence high ability candidates would face a probability of
victory equal to one, while low ability candidates would be replaced by a new candidate
and the incumbent party would win with probability one half. Therefore, the ex-ante
probability of victory for an incumbent party would be ￿I = f(￿H) + 1
2f(￿L) and so
IA = 2￿I ￿ 1 = f(￿H) > 0: That is, positive incumbency advantage obtains even when
low type candidates are more numerous.
6. Concluding Remarks
For the past thirty years, scholars have been increasingly concerned about the advantage
that incumbent politicians seem to enjoy and its implications for the representativity
of elections and the accountability of representatives. In this paper we have explained
incumbency advantage by means of the informational value of being in power questioning
the causality relation between high reelection rates and legislature irresponsibility.
One of the novelties of the paper is a new measure of incumbency advantage that
di⁄ers from the mere observation of incumbents￿probability of victory. We show that
the probability of victory of incumbents may be prove to be misleading and argue that
in order to capture the real impact of incumbency in the probability of reelection, we
need to compare the current situation with the case where the incumbent run as a chal-
lenger. Our analysis also shows that if we want to focus on the probability of reelection
17of current incumbents, we need to make parties ex-ante comparable (that is, controlling
for any ideological advantage/disadvantage that the incumbent party may enjoy). For,
only in this case, there is a one-to-on relationship between incumbency advantage and
the probability of victory. This is in fact the approach taken in the empirical analy-
sis of Lee(forth.), who obtains an incumbency advantage of 40%. But, as our paper
emphasizes, the connection between this ￿nding and legislature irresponsibility is still
inconclusive, for it may be (totally or partially) explained by the information attached
to incumbency.
Finally, since candidate ability plays a central role in our approach, it is important
to elaborate on it. Our view of candidate￿ s ability corresponds to candidate quality
in Stone et al. (2004) and Krasno and Green (1988). A candidate￿ s ability or quality
is "inherent to the individual candidate, prior to and distinct from that candidate￿ s
performance [...] It is a resource a candidate brings to his or her campaign" (Stone et
al. 2004, p.480). In particular, candidate quality di⁄ers from electoral prospects, that is,
candidate￿ s subjective probability of winning. The important ￿nding for our approach is
that incumbent quality a⁄ects reelection prospects. Actually, Stone, Maisel, and Mestas
show that incumbent personal quality has a strong e⁄ect on reelection prospects "both
indirectly by enhancing their strategic resources, and directly because personal quality
has value to voters and other in the district who determine the incumbent￿ s prospects
to continuing in o¢ ce" (p.487). Therefore, reinforcing the importance of candidates￿
quality. Thus our argument, in short, emphasizes that, because incumbency is a source
of information about candidate quality not available to the challenger, and quality
a⁄ects reelection prospects, we can expect incumbency to a⁄ect candidates￿chances of
winning without raising (at least partially) concerns on competition and representation
of elections.
18Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We know that B conditional to ￿ is normally distributed.
Therefore, h satis￿es the monotone likelihood ratio property (that is, if ￿ > ￿0; then
h(Bj￿)=h(Bj￿0) is strictly increasing in B), limB!￿1(h(Bj￿H)=h(Bj￿L)) = 0 and
limB!+1(h(Bj￿H)=h(Bj￿L)) = +1: It follows from the monotone likelihood ratio prop-






















The existence and uniqueness of BI are guaranteed by the monotonicity of ￿ and the
limit conditions above. Thus, the probability of reelection for a type ￿ incumbent (2:8);
can be written as








































which implies that the incumbent always gets reelected, ￿I(￿) = 1:
Finally, the monotone likelihood ratio property implies that Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H) > Pr(B ￿
BIj￿L):
Proof of Proposition 1
Since both parties are ex-ante comparable, expression (2.10) can be written as
￿(￿HjBI) = f(￿H); which implies that BI is implicitly de￿ned by h(BIj￿H) = h(BIj￿L):
Since the conditional distribution of B follows a Normal, BI = ￿H+￿L
2 : Furthermore, in
this case Pr(B ￿ BIj￿L) = 1 ￿ Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H): Thus, the probability of reelection for
the incumbent party can be written as:
￿I = (f(￿H) ￿ f(￿L))Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H) + f(￿L): (6.1)
We also know that IAI = 2￿I ￿ 1: Then, rearranging terms
IAI = (f(￿H) ￿ f(￿L))(2 Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H) ￿ 1):
Because Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H) > 1=2; the sign of IAI coincides with the sign of (f(￿H)￿f(￿L))
as we wanted to prove.
Proof of Proposition 2.
i) f(￿H) > f(￿L):
Denote by h(Bj￿;￿) the conditional density function of B when the variance is ￿2:
Given that both parties are ex-ante comparable, expression (2.10) can be written as
￿(￿HjBI) = f(￿H); which implies that BI is implicitly de￿ned by h(BIj￿H;￿) =






Figure 6.1: Companion ￿gure to the proof of proposition 2. Two distributions of the
external signal B for a high type candidate. The distribution with a lower dispersion
￿0 (< ￿1) represents a more informative signal.
and is independent on ￿: Furthermore, in this case Pr(B ￿ BIj￿L;￿) = 1 ￿ Pr(B ￿
BIj￿H;￿): Thus, the probability of reelection can be written in terms of ￿ as
￿I(￿) = (f(￿H) ￿ f(￿L))Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿) + f(￿L): (6.2)
It is enough to show that Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿) is decreasing with ￿:
Take ￿0 < ￿1; and let K be such that h(￿H ￿ Kj￿H;￿0) = h(￿H ￿ Kj￿H;￿1). Refer to
Figure 6.1 to follow the proof. For all B ￿ ￿H ￿K; h(Bj￿H;￿0) ￿ h(Bj￿H;￿1); and for
all B 2 [￿H ￿ K;￿H]; h(Bj￿H;￿0) ￿ h(Bj￿H;￿1):
First, if BI ￿ ￿H ￿ K; H(BIj￿H;￿0) < H(BIj￿H;￿1); which implies that Pr(B ￿
BIj￿H;￿0) > Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿0):








Since h(Bj￿H;￿0) ￿ h(Bj￿H;￿1) for all BI ￿ B ￿ ￿H; then H(BIj￿H;￿0) < H(BIj￿H;￿1);
which implies that Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿0) > Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿1):
We have shown then that Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿) is decreasing in ￿; concluding the proof of
21this part.
ii) f(￿H) < f(￿L):
Let g(￿H) = 1￿f(￿H): From (6.2), the reelection probability for a distribution of types
f can be expressed in terms of ￿ as
￿I
f(￿) = (f(￿H) ￿ f(￿L))Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿) + f(￿L): (6.3)
Thus,
￿I
f(￿) = ￿(g(￿H) ￿ g(￿L))Pr(B ￿ BIj￿H;￿) + 1 ￿ g(￿L) = ￿￿I
g(￿) + 1:
Since g(￿H) > g(￿L); we know from part (i) that ￿I
g(￿) is decreasing in ￿. Therefore
￿I
f(￿) is increasing in ￿; proving that the incumbency disadvantage decreases with ￿.
We introduce the following notation and provide a new lemma for the proof of
Proposition 3.
Given a distribution of types, f; and the ideological bias of the electorate towards party
D, ￿f = Ef(uD
m) ￿ Ef(uR
m); rewrite the right hand side of (2.10) as
KD




if party D is the incumbent, and as
KR









m(￿L) = ￿H ￿ ￿L: By Lemma 1, there exist BJ
f (￿f), J 2 fD;Rg; such that the
probability of reelection for party J can be written as ￿J(￿) = Pr(B ￿ BJ
f (￿f)j￿) .
Since B conditional to ￿ is normally distributed, we can compute explicitly BJ
f (￿f);


















22Lemma 2. Let IAD
f (￿f) be the incumbency advantage of party D when types are
distributed according to f. Let g(￿L) = 1 ￿ f(￿L);then IAD
g (￿g) = ￿IAD
f (￿f):




m(￿L) = ￿H ￿ ￿L: Since g(￿L) =
1 ￿ f(￿L); then ￿f = ￿g: In what follows we will use ￿ as the bias towards party D.


























f (￿) and BR
f (￿) are de￿ned in (6.6).
It follows from (6.4) and (6.5) that KD
g (￿) = 1 ￿ KR
f (￿) and KR
g (￿) = 1 ￿ KD
f (￿):
Therefore, BD
g (￿) = ￿H+￿L￿BR
f (￿) and BR
g (￿) = ￿H+￿L￿BD
f (￿): And consequently,
Pr(B ￿ BD
g (￿)j￿H) = Pr(B ￿ BR
f (￿)j￿L), Pr(B ￿ BD
g (￿)j￿L) = Pr(B ￿ BR
f (￿)j￿H);
Pr(B ￿ BR
g (￿)j￿H) = Pr(B ￿ BD
f (￿)j￿L); and Pr(B ￿ BR
g (￿)j￿L) = Pr(B ￿
BD
f (￿)j￿H): Using these four equalities into (6.7) we obtain IAD
f (￿) = ￿IAD
g (￿):
Proof of Proposition 3.
Since the distribution of types f is ￿x throughout the proof, we omit the subscript
f: From (6.4) and (6.5) KD(￿￿) = KR(￿): Then BD(￿) = BR(￿￿) (6.6), and
IAD(￿) = IAD(￿￿) (6.7). Thus, if su¢ ces to concentrate on IAD(￿) for ￿ ￿ 0.
We will also omit the argument ￿ for all functions except when necessary for the expo-
sition.
23Figure 6.2: Companion ￿gure to the proof of Proposition 3. Reelection threshold values
of the signal for each party in the presence of an ideological bias ￿; BD(￿) and BR(￿).
In the absence of an ideological bias both parties face the same threshold BD(0) =
BR(0). Observe that h(BD(￿)j￿) = h(2BD(0) ￿ BD(￿)j￿).
First, we need to show that jIA(0)j > jIA(￿)j for all ￿ > 0: Let f(￿H) > f(￿L) and
refer to Figure 6.2. Using Lemma 1, write
IAD(￿) ￿ IAD(0) = f(￿H) [Pr
￿















BR(0) ￿ B ￿ BR(￿)j￿L
￿
];
where BD(￿) and BR(￿) are de￿ned in (6.6), and hence BD(0) = BR(0) = ￿H+￿L
2 :
Each of the two bracketed terms in expression (6.8) can be interpreted as the di⁄erence
between the gain in the probability of victory from a bias in favor and the loss from a
bias against for a high and low type, respectively. Since H(Bj￿H) is a translation to








BD(0) ￿ B ￿ 2BD(0) ￿ BD(￿)j￿L
￿
:








BR(0) ￿ B ￿ BR(￿)j￿L
￿
;
implying that the gain in the probability of victory for a high type from a bias in favor
is smaller than the loss from a bias against for a low type. Similarly, the gain in the
probability of victory for a low type from a bias in favor is smaller than the loss from a
bias against for a high type. Going back to expression (6.8), IAD(￿) < IAD(0):
The proof for f(￿L) > f(￿H) follows directly from the previous case and Lemma 2.
Thus IAD(￿) > IAD(0) in this case.
Now we are left with showing the monotonicity of IA as a function of ￿ under the
conditions stated in the proposition.
i) f(￿H) > f(￿L).
Rewrite party D￿ s incumbency advantage as
IAD(￿) = 1 ￿ f(￿H)(H(BDj￿H) + H(BRj￿H)) ￿ f(￿L)(H(BDj￿L) + H(BRj￿L));
and take derivatives with respect to ￿: Using that ￿(￿HjBD) = KD; ￿(￿HjBD) = KR

























25For all relevant values of ￿; @BD
@￿ < 0 and @BR





























2￿2(BR ￿ BD)(2￿H ￿ (BR + BD)): (6.10)
From the de￿nitions of BD and BR;
1


















































































































(1 ￿ KR)KD ln
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then, we only need to show that for all relevant values of ￿
ln
KR(1 ￿ KD)
(1 ￿ KR)KD ￿ 12: (6.11)
Let Q =
KR(1￿KD)
(1￿KR)KD: It is easy to show that, for all relevant values of ￿; Q is an increasing














27function of ￿: Thus, it su¢ ces to show that (6.11) holds for the largest ideological bias
under consideration, ￿max: Let ￿max = k f(￿L)(￿H ￿ ￿L); with k close to 1. Then
Q(￿max) =
f(￿H) (1 ￿ k2) + k + k2
f(￿H) (1 ￿ k2) ￿ k + k2;
which is a decreasing function of f(￿H): Thus, in order to show that (6.11) holds, it is






2 (1 ￿ k2) + k + k2
1
2 (1 ￿ k2) ￿ k + k2 ￿ e12; for all k ￿ :995:
We can conclude then that, for f(￿H) > f(￿L); IAD is decreasing in ￿ for all ￿ ￿
0:995 f (￿H)(￿H ￿ ￿L):
ii) f(￿H) < f(￿L):
Now we need to show that IAD
f (￿) is increasing for all ￿ ￿ 0: Let g(￿H) = 1￿f(￿H) >
g(￿L):By lemma 2 IAD
g (￿) = ￿IAD
f (￿): From case 1, IAD
g (￿) is decreasing in ￿: Then
IAD
f (￿) is increasing in ￿; and we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. A t-term incumbent has been reelected for t ￿ 1 times,
which implies that the last realization of B was larger than BI
t￿1: Voters will reelect the
incumbent whenever the realization of B is larger than BI




￿t(￿H) = ￿t￿1(￿H) + Pr(BI
t ￿ B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿H) (6.12)
￿t(￿L) = ￿t￿1(￿L) + Pr(BI
t ￿ B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿L)
The probability of winning for the incumbent increases with respect to the previous
election if
￿t(￿H) ￿t(￿H) + ￿t(￿L) ￿t(￿L) > ￿t￿1(￿H) ￿t￿1(￿H) + ￿t￿1(￿L) ￿t￿1(￿L); (6.13)
28or, equivalently
(￿t(￿H) ￿ ￿t(￿L))￿t(￿H) + ￿t(￿L) ￿ ￿t￿1(￿L) >
(￿t￿1(￿H) ￿ ￿t￿1(￿L))￿t￿1(￿H):
It follows from (6:12) that
(￿t(￿H) ￿ ￿t(￿L))￿t(￿H) + ￿t(￿L) ￿ ￿t￿1(￿L) =
(￿t￿1(￿H) ￿ ￿t￿1(￿L))￿t(￿H)+
Pr(BI
t ￿ B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿H)￿t(￿H)+
Pr(BI
t ￿ B ￿ BI
t￿1j￿L)￿t(￿L):
Since ￿t(￿H) > ￿t￿1(￿H); inequality (6:13) holds.
Finally, since ￿R
1 does not depend on t; it follows from the de￿nition of incumbency
advantage (2:12) that IAD
t is increasing in t:
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